Consistency Testing in WTO Law and the Special Case of Moral Regulation

Abstract

Abstract There is a debate in World Trade Organization (WTO) law about whether the right to regulate for public interest purposes is conditioned on a requirement to do so consistently. While the early Appellate Body (AB) jurisprudence eschewed consistency testing under the formal legal test, it refrained from explicitly rejecting the practice. Subsequent AB rulings have seemingly adopted a narrow type of consistency testing through the doctrine of ‘legitimate regulatory distinctions’. A case could also be made that WTO tribunals sometimes embrace consistency testing under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, although this is not explicitly acknowledged or universally recognized. In Seals, Canada explicitly attacked the European Union’s (EU) seal products ban for its lack of consistency with the EU’s broader animal welfare settings. This dispute provided an opportunity – indeed, an obligation – for the AB to establish a clear doctrine on consistency testing. This article argues that the AB shirked its duty through reasoning techniques that avoided meaningful engagement with the substance of Canada’s argument. The AB did not truly reject consistency testing, but its precise views are hard to glean due to reasoning that is opaque, confused and even contradictory. This article argues that there is a compelling case for consistency testing, at least in certain ‘public morals’ disputes, and that the AB should provide clearer guidance.