Abstract
In house allocation problems, we look for a systematic way of assigning a set of indivisible objects, e.g., houses, to a group of individuals having preferences over these objects. Typical real life examples are graduate housing, assignment of offices and tasks. Once an allocation is decided upon, the actual assignments of the agents are not likely to take place simultaneously. Therefore, rules whose predictions are independent of the sequence in which the actual assignments are realized turn out to be very appealing. We model this property via the consistency principle and identify various classes of consistent rules and correspondences.
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