Considering individual game behavior and time delay in the multi-channel rumor propagation model

Abstract

The rapid development of the Internet has accelerated the spread of rumors, posing challenges to social cohesion and stability. To address this, a multi-channel rumor propagation model incorporating individual game behavior and time delay is proposed. It depicts individuals strategically choosing propagation channels in the rumor spread process, capturing real-world intricacies more faithfully. Specifically, the model allowing spreaders to choose between text and video information base channels. Strategy adoption hinges on benefits versus costs, with payoffs dictating strategy and the propagation process determining an individual’s state. By theoretical analysis of the model, the propagation threshold and equilibrium points are obtained. Then the stability of the model is further demonstrated based on Routh–Hurwitz judgment and Descartes’ Rule of Signs. Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the correctness of the theoretical results and the sensitivity of the model to key parameters. The outcomes reveal that increasing the propagation cost of spreaders can significantly curb the spread of rumors. In contrast to the classical ISR model, rumors spread faster and more widely in the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model in this paper, which is a feature more aligned with real-world scenarios. Finally, the validity and predictive ability of the model are verified by using real rumor propagation data sets, indicating that the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model has good practical application and predictive value.