Considerations of Force in Cordell Hull's Diplomacy, July 26 to November 26, 1941

Abstract

The need to integrate military and diplomatic considerations in a nation's foreign policy cannot be disputed.1 Yet Cordell Hull seems to have ignored this fact of international life during his tenure as secretary of state. At no time was this tendency more apparent and more critical than in the six months preceding his rejection of Japan's Proposal B on 26 November 1941. During those months, he never completely managed to interrelate his diplomatic recommendations with the state of readiness of the armed forces. The secretary was not alone in his failure to join the two elements. The vast majority of State Department officers were guilty of the same short-sightedness. Indeed, during the 1930s, in the face of German and Japanese military moves, they made virtually no effort to coordinate their policies with those of army and navy planners. The result was that American military leaders made war plans without regard to foreign policy goals, while their diplomatic counterparts never seriously related foreign policy to military capabilities and requirements. For example, the United States Navy prepared elaborate Orange War Plans to use in anticipation of a Japanese conflict at the same time American diplomats centered their attention on Europe and renounced thoughts of war in East Asia.2