Considerations for better construction and demolition waste management: Identifying the decision behaviors of contractors and government departments through a game theory decision-making model

Abstract

There is a lack of a clear description of the decision-making behaviors of major participants in construction and demolition (C&D) waste management. In order to achieve better and more efficient C&D waste management, this paper utilizes the evolutionary game to identify the decision-making behavior of construction contractors and government departments from theoretical perspectives. The decision-making behaviors of both participants in different circumstances are discussed in detail to clarify their roles. The results show that the supervisory intensity, supervision costs, penalties, waste disposal costs and revenues from illegal dumping are some main factors influencing the decision behaviors of contractors and government departments. Moreover, raising the penalty without maintaining the probability of supervision at a proper level is ineffective for controlling illegal-dumping while public participation in supervision could be an important supplement. Finally, a simple model based on decision behaviors is given to determine the appropriate value of penalties. A government set penalty at 66.67 yuan/ton with the probability of supervision of 22.5% could achieve the efficient control of illegal-dumping when the probability of illegal-dumping is 60%. Therefore, this study could be used as the basis for an efficient C&D waste management framework.