CONSIDERACIONES CRÍTICAS A LA EQUIPARACIÓN ENTRE COMPRENSIÓN Y KNOW-HOW EN ALGUNAS INTERPRETACIONES PRAGMATISTAS DEL PENSAMIENTO DE HEIDEGGER

Abstract

This paper discusses how the Heideggerian concept of understanding (Verstehen) is typically equated with the notion of know-how, particularly in pragmatist interpretations of Heidegger’s work. The relevance of G. Ryle’s thought in the development of the philosophical notion of know-how is well known. The first part of this article shows that, in despite of some general similarities, the Heideggerian notion of understanding and Ryle’s notion of know-how differ in fundamental aspects. The second part discusses some of the relevant appraisals of Brandom’s interpretation of the Heideggerian Verstehen. The third part considers and discusses Okrent’s pragmatist interpretation of Heidegger’s notion. Finally, the article shows that this reading has a limited scope as the modal distinction between authentic and unauthentic understanding becomes irrelevant.