Conservatism, Pragmatism, and Historical Inquiry

Abstract

In a 2001 article entitled “The Classical Conservative Challenge to Dewey,” Shawn O’Dwyer puts John Dewey’s understanding of method to the test of criticisms made by conservative theorist Michael Oakeshott. Oakeshott criticizes the view that technical knowledge is superior to the reliance on custom, tradition, and habit in practical knowledge, that moral intelligence can be taught, and that moral intelligence consists of the application of techniques to resolve problems. O’Dwyer concludes that Dewey’s reflections on moral deliberation pass Oakeshott’s challenge to rationalism “with its central themes intact, if not unscathed.”1 In light of O’Dwyer’s article, we see that the classical conservatives and the classical pragmatists share some enticing similarities in their views on moral philosophy. Both acknowledge that “inquiry draws upon its own inheritance of beliefs from the past, beliefs successfully yielded by past inquiry, and avails itself of them as resources in addressing present problems.” O’Dwyer continues, “Inquiry, then, is not external to tradition, and it is not ahistorical; it stands in continuity with past ideas, and these comprise its own traditions.”2 Additionally, despite the fact that Oakeshott made few references to the mood and method of American philosophical pragmatism, and in the few instances where he does refer to pragmatism, he often does so in order to distinguish his position from it,3 the secondary literature provides some insights into an overlap between Oakeshott and American pragmatism. For example, the conservative disposition that Oakeshott illustrates and the conservative moral philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce offer enticing points