Consequentialism, egoism, and the moral law

Abstract

It is often claimed that Kant rejected utilitarianism. The basis for this claim, however, is not entirely clear. It would, of course, be foolish to deny that Kant's ethical writings have a distinctly non-utilitarian flavor. One clear example is his discussion of punishment (1797a: 331-334) and another example is his essay "On the Alleged Right to Tell a Lie from a Benevolent Motive"'. In these cases, and many others, Kant exhibits his non-consequentialist tendencies. Furthermore, Kant's supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative, is not the principle of utility. Indeed, Kant claims that all of "the confusions of philosophers concerning the supreme principle of morals" results from their failure to see "that the moral law is that which first defines the concept of the good" (1788: 64). In contrast to teleological accounts of moral reasons, Kant's "second proposition" in the first chapter of the Groundwork states.