Abstract
In this article, consensus, defined as the consent of all citizens, is argued to be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Consensus would be the foundation of the liberal society that, when out of reach, needs to be approximated through, for instance, voting (majority rule). I build on the timid attempts in political theory at using the theorem of the second best as a tool to settle difficult decision making in applied political theory. More precisely, I defend the view that consensus would be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Furthermore, I illustrate how moral, factual, (and, incidentally, epistemological) disagreements may create second-best problems, especially in terms of stability. Finally, I spell out some reasons why such problems directly affect a liberal order, on pragmatic grounds. The final purpose is to contribute to the literatures on legitimacy and on the application of the theorem of the second best outside economics. The key idea is to stress that much more work has to be done for “importing” the theorem of the second best into political theory.
Highlights
RÉSUMÉ : Dans cet article, le consensus, défini comme le consentement de tous les citoyens, est présenté comme remplissant la fonction d’optimum de premier rang [ first best] pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique
If we accept the relevance of economic concepts for political theory, and the possibility that consensus could be presented as a first best, a manner to look at situations where consensus is not reachable is to call to the second-best theorem (TSB hereafter)
Looking back at the TSB fifty years on, Lipsey (2007, p. 356) indicates that second-best issues call for pragmatism, especially because no global secondbest solutions can be tailored for economics
Summary
As shown by Bellamy (1999), some liberals (and other political theorists) value consensus as the first best for the legitimacy of political decisions, institutions, or regimes. Consensus plays a central role in liberal legitimacy for some authors (e.g., for Rawlsians), at least when it concerns the basic structure of the society and public reason In other words, it is the first best: the legitimacy of political decisions or institutions in a liberal regime depends on the actual or hypothetical consent of all individuals. When consensus is not attainable under reasonable assumptions, the solution is to approximate it, by retaining some first-best conditions: the consent of all is kept, but, for instance with Rawls, restricted to a limited set of principles or values.10 This restriction stems from a deflationist strategy that distinguishes metaphysical and political principles, insulates the latter from moral controversies, and searches for a consensus on these principles (and not on a full-blooded conception of the society). How do they affect decision rules that approximate consensus (e.g., majority rule, representation)?
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