Consciousness

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that nonconceptual conscious perception as explored earlier in the book challenges cognitive theories of consciousness such as the global workspace and higher order thought approaches. The chapter starts with a discussion of whether the neural basis of consciousness is centered in the “front” of the head or the “back” (using the shorthand version of the opposition). This discussion is coupled with appeals to the distinction between contingent and causal factors in the neural basis of consciousness. With those ideas as background, the discussion turns to the difference between phenomenal and access consciousness. The heart of the chapter is an argument, based on the discussion of Chapter 6 that infants between 6 and 11 months old have phenomenal-consciousness of color without access-consciousness of color. The discussion then turns to empirical arguments given by Hakwan Lau and Richard Brown involving appeals to hallucination and to two forms of “inflation,” peripheral inflation and inattentional inflation. The discussion then turns to overflow, biological reductionism, direct awareness and teleological views. Then David Chalmers’ Fading Qualia argument is addressed. The chapter ends with a discussion of consciousness and free will.