Abstract
An understanding of the relationship of consciousness to brain is integral to the development of a general theory for psychiatry. It is argued that objections to Feigl's psychoneural identity thesis can be countered by considering consciousness as identical with pure which, to an observer, are neurally embodied. Consciousness may be subdivided into contents and the conscious context (consciousness per se) which are respectively identical with representation events that code input to the brain and processing events which do not code input but comprise intrinsic organizations. The phenomenal I, the so-called ghost in the machine, is held to be identical with processing events on the output side of the nervous system.
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