Conscientious Objection and the State

Abstract

The abundant writing on conscientious objection (CO) had kept one significant actor rather neglected—the state. Relatively unexplored is the question of how democracies shape their policies toward CO. This article wishes to address this gap, focusing in particular on states that maintain conscription, and examining what accounts for their different responses to CO. Based on the Israeli case study, while drawing on comparative insights from The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland during the Cold War, I argue that states’ treatment of CO depends primarily on the military’s status and the type of roles assigned to conscription. States in which these roles are mainly functional, and the military does not enjoy, accordingly, a high symbolic status will be more inclined to formally recognize CO than states in which the military fulfills civilian–social roles and enjoys a high symbolic status. Lack of recognition, however, does not necessarily imply harshness; states of the latter sort might nonetheless accommodate CO through unofficial means. Thus, when discussing the policy towards CO a distinction is ought to be made between accommodation and recognition.