Abstract
In this paper I explore some of the most important aspects of Bolzano’s logical and gnoseological theory. Bolzano’s basic logical notion of Satz an sich (proposition in itself) seems to lead him to a sort of Platonism. Contrary to what is often assumed, I attempt to demonstrate that Bolzano is not a realist, by showing that propositions in themselves are not real objects. In a second part of this paper, I analyze Bolzano’s point of view about nature and function of logical entities, their relation to psychology and their respective role within the theory of knowledge.
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