Conjoint Federalism and Environmental Regulation in the United States

Abstract

Many of the environmental laws enacted by Congress employ a distinctive blend of national and state authority. In these conjoint arrangements, state authority is not totally preempted, but it is subordinated to national authority if states wish to participate in environmental regulation. Under normal circumstances, national and state authority are deployed concurrently in pursuit of environmental policy objectives. Conjoint arrangements are much more controlling of state action than the stimulative andfacilitative approach to intergovernmental program implementation commonly associated with cooperative federalism. Despite national primacy, in the bargaining that marks implementation processes, state officials may enjoy considerable influence. Although administratively cumbersome and criticized from a variety of perspectives, conjoint arrangements are not the mqajor reasons for a slow rate of improvement in environmental quality. When the various options are considered, there are reasons to conclude that conjoint arrangements are the most realistic means for attacking environmental problems, although questions remain about the appropriate balance of national and state authority in them.