Abstract
Reydon (2012) comments on my account of how-possibly explanation (Forber, 2010). I distinguish between three types of explanation (global how-possibly, local how-possibly, and how actually) and argue that these distinctions track various roles explanations play in evolutionary biology. While Reydon accepts the distinctions, he questions whether the two different types of how-possibly explanation count as genuine explanations. He summarizes his analysis with a slogan: “global how-possibly explanations are explanations but not how-possibly; local explanations are how-possibly but not explanations.” Reydon’s commentary raises a number of insightful points, and I will not be able to address them all. Instead, after clarifying certain points in my original paper (§ 1), I will respond to Reydon’s slogan by addressing whether global how-possibly explanations should count as explaining how possible (§ 2), and what (so-called) local how-possibly explanations are, if not explanations (§ 3).
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