Abstract
The United States is the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, providing resources in exchange for voting power in these international financial institutions (IFIs). While the Treasury Department manages U.S. participation in these institutions, Congress retains authority on funding. With the aim of understanding the microincentives of U.S. support for the IFIs, I analyze congressional voting on bills to fund the IFIs. I argue that Members of Congress are more likely to support a funding increase (1) the more liberal their ideology, (2) the larger the share of campaign contributions they get from banks that specialize in international lending, and (3) the larger the share of voters that gain from economic globalization that reside in their districts. Statistical analyses of voting on five IFI funding bills since 1977 provide support for these arguments.
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