Congressional Preemption: Regulatory Federalism

Abstract

Congressional Preemption: Regulatory Federalism. By Joseph F. Zimmerman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 288p. 24.95 paper. The adoption by Congress of major statutes regulating the environment, workplace, and consumer transactions, beginning in the mid-1960s, has been seen by critics as granting too much authority to the federal government at the expense of the states. The critique of federal social regulation initiatives questions not only whether such policy interventions can be justified per se, but as importantly, whether congressional preemption itself is appropriate. Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan sought specific legislative and policy changes aimed at shifting formal authority away from Congress and back to the states—a “new federalism” to reverse the expansion of federal authority. At least rhetorically (though not necessarily substantively), President George W. Bush has taken a similar stance. But the perceived need to check federal authority is not the sole purview of conservatives; President Jimmy Carter supported a significant program of economic deregulation, and President Bill Clinton oversaw initiatives to devolve federal authority as part of a broader reform of federal public management practices.