Abstract

Recent congressional debates on neutrality legislation have once more focused attention on the problem of control of American foreign policy. On the one hand, the President has demanded that leadership in formulation of foreign policy be concentrated in the hands of the executive; on the other hand, Congress has insisted that its powers be employed to provide for adequate control of that leadership on behalf of the people. This problem of executive leadership and proper control is, perhaps, the central problem of the machinery of democratic government, but in the field of foreign policy it is a particularly difficult one because constitutional construction and usage have failed to draw definite boundaries as to congressional and executive powers. If Congress is the instrument through which popular control of the executive is to be exercised, it is important to study the adequacy or inadequacy of such control.

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