Abstract

Congressional influence is generally discounted or ignored in political models of Federal Reserve Behavior. Here I show that changes in the leadership of the Senate Banking Committee are significantly correlated with monetary base growth. More liberal Committee leaders are associated with significantly higher base growth, other factors held constant. The result is shown to hold across several econometric specifications and different definitions of the congressional preference variable.

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