Abstract
One of the few works that finds strong evidence of congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy is Grier (1991), which finds a direct relationship between the liberalism of the Senate oversight committee leadership and monetary base growth. We extend this analysis by considering a longer sample period and by considering the preferences of House oversight committee leaders, in addition to Senators. Grier's evidence is not robust to these extensions. Where we do find correlation between congressional preferences and monetary base growth, increased liberalism of congressional oversight committees is associated with lower monetary base growth.
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