Abstract

Practitioners and observers of political behavior commonly suppose that the geographical distribution of governmentally generated benefits is an electorally salient issue. This paper examines relationships between the geographical patterns of US Federal outlays and popular voting for incumbent US Representatives as a means of testing the hypothesis that incumbent Representatives enhance their reelection prospects by ‘bringing home the bacon’ to their districts.

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