Congress and Back Seat Driving

Abstract

Few pieces of legislation in the realm of foreign policy decisionmaking have greater potential effect or are more controversial than the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution was intended originally to create greater leverage for Congress over executive use of military force. In this effort, it is widely believed that the Resolution has been ineffective. This paper uses an information theoretic model to examine the War Powers Resolution. Results of the modeling process allow for two general assertions. First, the model suggests that the Resolution is an optimal choice of procedure by the legislature. In other words, the War Powers Resolution is better for Congress than its alternatives. Second, the information theoretic approach used here seems to coincide with an anecdotal history of the war powers debate better than do alternative explanations. Indeed, the analysis helps to explain why war powers legislation was not considered seriously sooner. Though criticism of the War Powers Resolution has its merits, claims for a variety of alternative procedural systems may be open to challenge. Those wishing to establish mechanisms for curtailing executive adventurism abroad may find it more rewarding to focus efforts on the budgeting process or on the reduction of military force structures.