Confusion cannot explain cooperative behavior in public goods games

Abstract

Some scholars find that behavioral variation in the public goods game is explained by variations in participants' understanding of how to maximize payoff and that confusion leads to cooperation. Their findings lead them to question the common assumption in behavioral economics experiments that choices reflect motivations. We conduct two experiments, in which we minimize confusion by providing participants with increased training. We also introduce a question that specifically assesses participants' understanding of payoff maximization choices. Our experimental results show that the distribution of behavior types is significantly different when participants play with computers versus humans. A significant increase in contributions is also observed when participants play with humans compared to when they play with computers. Moreover, social norms may be the main motive for contributions when playing with computers. Our findings suggest that social preferences, rather than confusion, play a crucial role in determining contributions in public goods games when playing with humans. We therefore argue that the assumption in behavioral economics experiments that choices reveal motivations is indeed valid.