Confronting stylized facts with reality

Abstract

The article focuses on the role of interest groups in policy making under conditions of globalisation. Building on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem from international trade theory, it has been argued in the literature that interest groups’ domestic political negotiation power varies with the mobility of their factor of production, and that therefore a policy shift towards the interests of capital owners (i.e. liberalisation of domestic regulations) should be observable. Drawing on empirical evidence from detailed case studies in the area of state banking regulation in the United States, Switzerland, and Spain, the article presents examples for bank associations and other representatives of the capital side to blocking or considerably delaying government-initiated attempts at liberalisation. It also demonstrates that the role of interest groups in policy making varies considerably between countries, and that therefore highly specific patterns of interaction exist between interest groups and national political systems. The article concludes therefore that the consideration of situation-specific context, rather than the use of generalising assumptions on a highly aggregated level, is called for in the analysis of interest group influence on policy making.