Confronting Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib in the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian crisis

Abstract

This article analyses the position of Algeria towards Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) and the Algerian strategy towards the crisis in northern Mali. Indeed, this article shows that the strategy of Algeria during the crisis and its support for a so-called ‘political solution’, stemmed from the Algerian experience during the civil war in the 1990s. The Algerian leadership considered that the turning point of the civil war against the jihadists was when there was a switch in strategy from the simple use of force against jihadist groups to initiating a dialogue with moderate groups, which resulted in the isolation and elimination of the radicals whereas the moderates surrendered. Algeria thus sought to apply the same strategy in northern Mali: to foster negotiation between the separatist MNLA Targui movement, the Salafist Targui group, Ansar al-Din, and the Malian government. This would have resulted in isolating AQIM and its the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest affiliate. However, the lack of reliability of Ansar al-Din eventually led to the failure of the strategy and to the launching of the French intervention in Mali.