Abstract
Abstract Messick et al. (1983) and Samuelson and Messick (1986) have proposed a conceptual model in which commons-dilemma behavior is governed by three conflicting motives: a desire to harvest as much as possible, a desire to use the resource responsibly, and a desire to conform to implicit group norms. Two experiments were conducted to examine more closely the influence of conformity on samples of American students. In Experiment 1 the mediating effects of punishment and a verbal warning on subject conformity were examined. Subjects were influenced by conformity regardless of the probability of punishment or the issuing of a verbal warning. In Experiment 2 conformity could be explained by the desire to seek social information regarding how to play the game rather than by competitive tendencies. Subjects conformed to the behavior of others even when it was against their best interest to do so.
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