Conflitti e trasformazioni nei modelli di governance

Abstract

This contribution aims at analysing the main issues in the current debate on corporate governance in major economic systems. The first step is the analysis of conflicts emerging in the so called “market model”, in particular the sharp contrast between top managers and shareholders. In second place the “stakeholders oriented model”, typical of Continental Europe and Japan, is taken into consideration, in order to highlight main problems and reform proposals. After that, an analysis is undertaken in order to discuss whether a given model of corporate governance is more or less effective for the long term growth and performance of firms and of economic system where these firms operate. The conclusion is that there is no “one best model” of corporate governance. As any model produces conflicts among stakeholders, the critical issue is the ability of both professionals and regulators, to solve these conflicts, converting them into elements which can support firm’s performances at the micro level and economic efficiency at the macro level.