Abstract
This paper reports the results of an experimental test of Nash equilibrium predictions of voluntary provision of property protection in a contest with an endogenously determined prize. The experiment investigates whether the mechanism of allowing irreversible contributions to security prior to choices over production and conflict induces positive provision of property protection due to the strategic effect on conflict, resulting in greater production. We find robust evidence that contributions to security increase with sequential decision-making, resulting in less conflict. However, there is no evidence that production increased. There is evidence larger groups resulted in less property protection and greater conflict.
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