Abstract
This paper examines the pricing characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. Assuming IPO underpricing is directly related to ex ante uncertainty, if the market rationally perceives these commercial banks to have a conflict of interest, these securities should have more underpricing than non‐commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings (all else being equal). On the other hand, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality, less underpricing should be observed. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999. We find that the underpricing of commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings in which the firm had a previous banking relationship with the underwriter is significantly less than those underwritten by investment banks.
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