Abstract
Realists and non-ideal theorists currently criticise Rawlsian mainstream liberalism for its inability to address injustice and political conflict, as a result of the subordination of political philosophy to moral theory (Bernard Williams), as well as an idealising and abstract methodology (Charles W. Mills). Seeing that liberalism emerged as a theory for the protection of the individual from conflict and injustice, these criticisms aim at the very core of liberalism as a theory of the political and therefore deserve close analysis. I will defend Judith N. Shklar’s liberalism of fear as an answer to these challenges. I will argue that the liberalism of fear maintains realism’s conflictual and inherently political thrust while also integrating a perspective on injustice. I will defend the claim that in contrast to the two aforementioned criticisms, the liberalism of fear develops its own normative standard from which political arrangements can be assessed. It does so by replacing the idealising approach to political philosophy with a non-utopian methodology, which opens a negative perspective on what is to be avoided in the political sphere, and how to detect and deal with injustice. Due to this standard, it is a liberal theory that is uniquely able to meet the realist and non-ideal challenge.
Highlights
In what has come to be diagnosed as the ‘crisis of liberalism’ (Kreide 2016), the writings of Judith N
While liberalism is not a monolithic theory and unites different versions under its tenet, all liberal theories share a core premise: namely, the normative primacy of individual liberty, which serves as a basis for concepts of legitimate political authority (Gaus et al 2018)
Despite significant changes Rawls made from the Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism, the Kantian concept of autonomy remains crucial for Rawls’s approach (Freeman 2016) and, as a result, for liberal debate as such
Summary
The realist critique of Rawlsian liberalism, most notably put forward by Bernard Williams (2005a, b), argues that contemporary liberalism is incapable of conceptualising genuinely political notions such as power and conflict due to its reliance on a specific conceptualisation of rationality and the resulting subordination of political philosophy to moral philosophy. The difference between political and moral conflict relates back to Williams’s rejection of Rawlsian ‘moralism’: Rawls’s theory relies on a Kantian, i.e. rationalist, framework for solving what, according to Williams, are essentially moral questions. Since the mere subjection of persons under a political order is rejected as illegitimate, it can be argued that he implicitly relies on moral principles regarding the question of what free and equal persons owe to each other In this respect, contemporary realism and liberalism are not that far apart. The realist conception opens space for political conflict and negotiation about the BLD without presupposing the necessity of a universal consensus This makes possible a distinction between political legitimacy, deriving from an answer to the first political question, and moral rightness in Kantian terms. I will argue that Shklar’s liberalism is able to integrate the concerns of realist theory, but avoids the imprecision regarding the normative status of her conception by providing her own, explicitly normative principle, which proceeds independent of moral theory
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
