Abstract
The conventional literature on the commons involves small, local resources such as coastal fisheries, community forestry, small-scale irrigation, and community pasture. We focus on conflict and cooperation in the Caspian Sea – a global commons – involving five claimant countries as well as interests of major powers (the United States, European Union, and China). Building on the work of Stern and Young on the study of conflict and cooperation in global commons, we model the case as a prisoner’s dilemma game with the two different outcomes. In the North Caspian Sea, competing claimant countries – Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan – have agreed to cooperate and solve their differences over ownership of oil fields. In contrast, claimants in the South Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan – have failed to cooperate despite decades of trying. Using analytic narratives, we suggest that politics (or strategic calculations) could help explain these two different outcomes. In making these calculations, countries will act in their rational self-interest, given the prospects of international anarchy. We suggest that this realist account can be partly explained by the convergence of economic interests, geopolitics, and cultural distance. We argue that the study of global commons would benefit from understanding realist theories of international relations.
Highlights
The conventional literature on the commons involves small, local resources such as coastal fisheries, community forestry, small-scale irrigation, and community pasture
We suggest that differences in the governance of the commons in the North and the South can be explained by economic interests, geopolitics and cultural distance between states
The conflict in the South Caspian Sea features similar determinants of non-cooperation or conflict described by Giordano, et al (2005): (1) resource ownership is ill-defined or non-existent, (2) existing institutional regimes are destroyed by political change (Soviet-Iranian treaties could not be enforced), and (3) rapid changes in environments outpace the capacity of existing institutions to deal with the issue
Summary
The conventional literature on the commons involves small, local resources such as coastal fisheries, community forestry, small-scale irrigation, and community pasture. Gas, and fishery are common pool resources because they are both rivalrous in consumption, and it is difficult to exclude others from exploiting them (Araral et al, 2019) Two of these claimant countries have powerful militaries – Russia and Iran – and have long histories of conflict in the Caspian Sea. In addition, China, the European Union, and the U.S all have vital interests at stake in the region, especially with regards to access to oil, shipping lanes, and pipelines. Claimants of the North Caspian Sea had managed to set aside their differences and cooperate to explore and develop their resources jointly This is not the case for the South Caspian neighbors. The final section summarizes the main findings and theoretical implications for the study of the global commons
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
