Confessions: A Model of Officials' Perspectives on Accepting Gifts from Clients in Post-Communist Europe

Abstract

There is widespread criticism of the behaviour of junior officials in post-communist Europe where they are often accused of treating citizens unfairly and soliciting presents or bribes to solve citizens' problems. To get the perspective of officials themselves we interviewed 1307 junior officials and state employees in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This paper focuses on their willingness to accept gifts from clients, their confessions to having done so, and the factors that lead some officials to accept gifts while others do not – factors such as occupational bargaining power and the (related) frequency of offers from clients, economic pressures, national and institutional cultures, fear of punishment, and moral perspectives on charging clients for favours. Economic pressures make officials more inclined to feel that they ‘could not afford to refuse’ gifts, but this motivation is only weakly related to actual behaviour. Occupational bargaining power and the frequency of offers from clients make them more likely to ‘welcome’ gifts or accept them ‘out of politeness' – and these less excusable motivations are more strongly related to actual gift-taking.