Confessional Stipulations: Protecting Waiver of Constitutional Rights

Abstract

The American criminal justice system is often criticized as complex and inefficient, better serving the interests of criminals than the interests of justice. While the criminal process may indeed be cumbersome, the system's procedural safeguards exist to ensure the protection of defendants' fundamental constitutional rights and, instrumentally, the rights of all citizens. These rights include the right to an attorney, the right against compelled selfincrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to call and confront witnesses. These explicit constitutional guarantees, coupled with various procedural safeguards, form the basic framework of our adversarial system of justice. Protecting these rights warrants a certain amount of complexity and inefficiency. Initially, a criminal defendant enjoys the full panoply of these rights and protections. If he pleads not guilty, he retains all of these constitutional rights and leaves the prosecution with the burden of proving guilt. Alternatively, a defendant may choose to plead guilty, waive his constitutional rights, and thereby forgo his right to put the state to its proof.' Judgment is then entered against him, and a sentence imposed. Because defendants who explicitly plead guilty waive many of their fundamental rights, the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose certain safeguards in such situations. As stated by the Supreme Court in Boykin v Alabama, the Constitution requires that a defendant waive his rights explicitly, and that this waiver be accompanied by evidence that his plea was knowing and voluntary.2 FRCrP 11 (Rule 11) adds a layer of procedural requirements: the judge must question the defendant personally in open court to ensure the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily, inform the defendant of his rights and the conse-