Conference Impressions: The Persisting Riddle of Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence and the Role of the Constitutional Court in a Democratic State

Abstract

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).