Abstract
Abstract Chapter 7 argues that inquisitive semantics is not only relevant for questions, but also for statements. The argument is based on recent experimental work on counterfactual conditionals, which shows that even if two premises A and B have exactly the same truth-conditions, the counterfactuals “If A then C” and “If B then C” may have different truth conditions. This means that it is impossible to give a compositional account of counterfactuals based on a purely truth-conditional notion of meaning. On the other hand, the relevant contrast finds a natural explanation once conditionals are analysed in inquisitive semantics. Further benefits of the account are discussed as well: it solves a well-known problem that classical analyses of conditionals have with disjunctive antecedents, and it naturally extends to unconditionals and conditional questions.
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