Abstract
This paper introduces simple conditionally stationary strategies and related stationary penal codes for dynamic games with perfect monitoring. The class of equilibria that these strategies support is defined—they are called conditionally stationary equilibria. The main results are necessary and sufficient conditions for extremal strategies, or corresponding penal codes, which give the minimal payoffs to players among conditionally stationary equilibria. Results are applied to resource extraction games.
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