Abstract
ABSTRACT In the 1999 Kargil War, India defended its territory from a Pakistani incursion but—in a departure from its historical behavior and standing war plans—chose not to expand the war with counter-attacks into Pakistan. Many observers attribute this restraint to nuclear deterrence, since India and Pakistan had become declared nuclear powers just a year earlier. In fact, India’s restraint was rooted not in deterrence, but specific strategic conditions. Those conditions no longer apply—and in a future conflict India may be encouraged to take especially risky and escalatory wartime action, which would pose an unprecedented test for nuclear deterrence.
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