Abstract
A dual-source model of probabilistic conditional inference is proposed. According to the model, inferences are based on 2 sources of evidence: logical form and prior knowledge. Logical form is a decontextualized source of evidence, whereas prior knowledge is activated by the contents of the conditional rule. In Experiments 1 to 3, manipulations of perceived sufficiency and necessity mapped on the parameters quantifying prior knowledge. Emphasizing rule validity increased the weight given to form-based evidence relative to knowledge-based evidence (Experiment 1). Manipulating rule form (only-if vs. if-then) had a focused effect on the parameters quantifying form-based evidence (Experiment 3). The model also provides a parsimonious description of data from the so-called negations paradigm and adequately accounts for polarity bias in that paradigm (Experiment 4). Relationships to alternative conceptualizations of conditional inference are discussed.
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More From: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
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