Concursus accidentium. Contingenza, accidentalità o virtualità dei corpi nell'ontologia di Giovanni Eriugena?

Abstract

The notion of body is remarkably complex in the History of Philosophy. In the logical-ontological perspective of Book I of Periphyseon, John Scotus defines body as set of accidents (concursus accidentium). This concept is close to the notion of individual in Porphyry, but the explicitly mentioned source of Periphyseon is De hominis opificio by Gregory of Nyssa, translated by John Scotus himself. This study examines in detail this complex Erigenian concept, both by identifying its links with contemporary debates on the nature of the Aristotelian categories and by setting parallels with contemporary texts (by Ratramnus of Corbie, Gotescalc, and Hincmar of Reims) on the corporeal nature of the soul and on its location, an issue already discussed by Gregory of Nyssa. According to Erigena, the spatiality of the soul is the logical limit which defines the soul’s created nature and excludes its corporeity. But how do we get the body from the non-corporeal essence and the logical categories? Following Gregory of Nyssa, Erigena distinguishes between categories that exclude materialization and those (quantitas, qualitas, situs, habitus) which, through something like a coitus mirabilis, finally reach the stage of corporeity.