Abstract
In a previous article I introduced the case for concurrent interpretation of legal texts that is that meaning is found in application and not in advance of application. As a counterpoint I examined and challenged the intentionalist thesis propounded by Stanley Fish and some others of the originalist position. That article was incomplete in two essential matters and the purpose of this article is to (i) examine and challenge the case for moderate intentionalism as opposed to the case for the strong intentionalism propounded by Fish and (ii) further explain the practical work of concurrent interpretation. It will be seen that these two tasks overlap and inform each other. The recent and much discussed case of Yemshaw provides a leitmotif and so the article seeks to contribute to the extensive discussion of that case and so-called interpretative ‘updating’ as well.
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