Concurrence

Abstract

Abstract This chapter goes to the heart of Kant’s theological problem, by focusing on the precise ‘causal joint’ between God’s creative action and our free actions. Drawing upon Freddoso, Burrell and Tanner, the chapter sets out the conceptual options in the medieval and early modern period for understanding the relationship between divine and human action: occassionalism, mere conservation and concurrence. The favoured position amongst orthodox philosophical theologians (including Aquinas, Suarez and Leibniz) was ‘concurrence’ or ‘concursus’, where God not only creates and sustains every creature, but acts directly in every action of every creature, including free human action. The chapter shows that Kant is a mere conservationist about both nature and human freedom. Although Kant uses the language of concursus in relation to miracles, and the assistance God gives to human beings, he does so in a ‘conservationist’ way that the tradition would consider to be theologically inadequate.