Concretism and Abstractism

Abstract

In this chapter I shall criticize a claim by Torbjorn Tannsjo, to the effect that particular actions should be identified with bodily movements. In normative contexts, at least, I believe that they are better seen as ‘abstract’ or non-physical entities. This view is shared by Bergstrom, who, following G.H. von Wright and others, adopts a version of ‘the causal theory of action’.1 According to this theory, [a] particular action a is the bringing about of a certain change c by a certain person P on a certain occasion or at a certain time t.... [A] particular action should be clearly distinguished from bodily movements, for such movements cannot reasonably be said to be the bringing about of a change. On the other hand, we may indeed speak of the bringing about of bodily movements, and we may also bring about something by means of bodily movements. Bodily movements may be observed, but the bringing about of something (i.e. an action) cannot be directly observed in the same sense. (Bergstrom(1), pp. 21–22.)