Conclusions

Abstract

Chapter 7 undertakes three tasks. First, it summarizes the core theoretical argument and the empirical support for the neoclassical realist theory, nuclear domino theory, credible sanctions theory, and security commitment theory hypotheses found inthe previous four chapters. The main take-away of the book is the following: The nonproliferation strategies the United States pursued toward vulnerable allies in the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia were inextricably linked to broader Cold War dynamics, as tempered by each administration’s ability to mobilize support or defuse opposition in Congress. The ultimate objective of each administration, from Kennedy to H. W. Bush, was to contain the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East and South Asia or to enlist China as an ally of convenience against the Soviets in East Asia. Second, Chapter 7 highlights several theoretical implications of this argument and avenues for future research. Third, the chapter briefly considers what neoclassical realist theory would suggest for some dilemmas in contemporary US foreign policy.