Abstract

This book has shown that post-communist Russian parliaments, at least until the latter half of Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term (2000–2004), have produced a relatively weak system of legislative governance: legislators have struggled to act collectively to address general interests and problems, especially in the area of economic policy. Despite the contrasting organisation and powers of the Supreme Soviet and the Federal Assembly, and the very different political circumstances within which both parliaments have operated, there are striking similarities in the indecisive, inconsistent and particularistic forms that legislative decision making has taken.KeywordsVeto PlayerExecutive BranchParliamentary ElectionLower HouseFederation CouncilThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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