Conclusion

Abstract

This chapter illustrates how philosophers endeavoring to integrate mentality into the world that science investigates naturally turn their gaze to computational approaches in cognitive science, such as the computational theory of mind. Three main problems lead to the suspicion that language of thought (LOT) may be an ill-conceived theory in the first place, even after considering the importance of computational approaches and the symbol-processing approach. First, there is the problem of the computational nature of the central system: LOT needs to move forward and orient itself with the current work on higher cognitive function in cognitive science to maintain a coherent account of the nature of the mind. Second, there is the problem of mental state individuation: as theories of the nature of thought, LOT and computational theory of mind (CTM) must update their notion of a mental state to overcome the criticism it has been receiving for years. Lastly, there is the problem of the relation between meaning and symbolic mental states: LOT’s theory of mental content clashes with its symbolic view of thinking, compromising LOT’s ability to explain thought and behavior.