Abstract
Abstract We summarize the argument of the book: the case for taking moral uncertainty seriously, and the case for an information-sensitive account: the correct rule for making decisions under moral uncertainty depends crucially on the information provided by the moral theories in which one has credence. We then note some open questions that would require further work to address, such as how to axiomatize decision-making under moral uncertainty, how we should assign deontic statuses, such as permissible and impermissible, under moral uncertainty, and what a reasonable credence distribution across different moral theories looks like. We end by considering what implications our argument has for the value of doing moral philosophy, suggesting we should conclude that further normative research is one of the most important moral priorities of our time.
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