Conclusion: In praise of human rights nihilism

Abstract

[T]he highest values are losing their value. (Nietzsche) I started this book because I found the idea of human rights both attractive and unconvincing, if not positively dangerous. This ambivalence drove me to ask: can we/should we believe in human rights? The last chapter has contended that different people will answer this question differently. Natural scholars, who regard human rights as inherent and inalienable entitlements, will respond: of course, we must believe in human rights! Protest scholars will give the same answer, but for a different reason: to them, human rights is the best language we have to set human beings free of oppression. Deliberative scholars do not think the issue is a matter of faith: they look at human rights as good political principles which have been agreed in some circles and hopefully will command greater and greater commitment. Finally, discourse scholars are sceptical: in their view the hype which surrounds human rights talk is misplaced; intellectually untenable and possibly morally counterproductive in inhibiting the imagination of more emancipatory projects. I have come to the conclusion that I am mostly a discourse scholar. At the end of this book, my personal ambivalence towards human rights has not subsided. I am clearer, however, as to why I am not as enthused by the concept as others are, as well as to the logic of my position.