Conclusion: How to Rule the Void? Policy Responses to a ‘Hollowing Out’ of Democracy

Abstract

Democracy requires the critical engagement of practitioners and experts alike. This special issue of Global Policy shows that recent developments in a number of European member states, but also in the US, have given rise to serious concerns about the current state of democracy generally. The erosion of trust in government and in established parties, the rise of (nationalist) populist movements and parties, lower voter turnout, and new forms of political engagement, the empowerment of executive branches – all these factors pose growing challenges to the future prospects of democracy. We might indeed witness what the late Peter Mair (2013) termed the ‘hollowing out’ of western democracies – an increasing ‘antipolitical’ sentiment from citizens and politicians alike. Other observers diagnose a ‘rollback’ of democracy, a backsliding into somewhat semi-authoritarian practices. However labelled, democracy, it appears, seems stalled in most, even retreating in some, and progressing a very few countries. What are the implications of such findings? The most important lesson is probably that these developments must be set into context – geographically as well as historically. First of all, while the erosion of trust in established democratic institutions is indeed a widespread, even transatlantic phenomenon, the degree to which a ‘hollowing out’ or ‘rollback’ of democracy takes places varies across countries and regions. The developments are particular worrying in the Eastern and Central European states, especially in Hungary and Latvia, and in those European states that have been hit hard by the financial crisis, including the Mediterranean ones, or struggle with economic development (cf. Greskovits, 2015; Weßels, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Bruszt, 2015). Second, the worrisome developments, in particular the erosion of trust in established democratic institutions, have different origins. They are driven by multidimensional, highly interwoven processes, which might be hard to disentangle across cases, if at all. They might be found in different public expectations, that is, in historically higher expectations of what a democracy could and should deliver (cf. Atanassow, 2015; Castiglione, 2015), in an ideological convergence or division within the different party systems and epistemic communities (cf. White, 2015; McCarty and Kuo, 2015; Ruser, 2015), but also – and prominently in the European context – in the unsolved economic crisis with its uneven consequences for different regions and groups (cf. Greskovits, 2015; Mungui-Pippidi, 2015). In other words, they are as much, more deep-seated, and not only a product of recent events and developments. This makes the ‘democracy problem’ a rather complex one. While such problems might prove difficult to solve, they can nonetheless be addressed. They require, to be sure, patience, careful analyses and critical discussions. Yet they also require less technocratic external interventions of the type that characterized 1990s support of democracy in accession countries. The question arises as to which structures and practices have to be changed to strengthen public participation and to enhance the legitimacy of democratic institutions in the medium- and long-term, and at what levels? The contributions in this issue have made clear that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, any solution requires a comprehensive approach tailored to national and regional needs and political agendas. Something new is needed, it seems. Perhaps a shift in emphasis from vertical to horizontal policy approaches within the EU, a geo-political re-orientation, or a series of smaller steps? What do the contributions in this issue propose? The contributions of Atanassow (2015) and Castiglione (2015) suggest that one way forward is to better clarify what we mean by democracy and democratic practices in the first place. A democratic order must not be defined by its existing procedures and political institutions – elections, referenda, parties, parliaments – since they are always in flux, but by its very purpose: collective self-determination. Each historical time requires different answers to achieve that goal, given prevailing social, economic and technological conditions. Underpinning concepts such as ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘representation’ could and maybe should be imagined differently in the 21st century. This is unavoidably both a normative and a long-term undertaking. The practical application of such an intellectual exercise might lead to a greater plurality and differentiation of the existing forms of democracy and thus better accommodation of local political preferences. Another set of more medium-term suggestions points to a strengthening of civil society and a greater participation of the electorate in political processes and decisions (cf. Greskovits, 2015; Leininger, 2015; White, 2015; Ruser, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Suggestions include greater NGO involvement, more use of referenda and forms of deliberative democracy, and new rights for citizens to contest executive decisions (‘right to challenge’) to allow for the accommodation of a wider range of political preferences. What such policy recommendations share is the promotion of a more inclusive concept of democracy, and the notion that popular involvement should not be restricted to voting alone. The solutions aim at enhancing legitimacy and responsiveness of democratic systems through more participatory channels and ways of inclusion. The goal here is to empower ‘the people’, by giving them a greater voice in multiple processes as well as ways and means. Other proposals target the efficacy, accountability and transparency of governance at regional, the national and the local levels. Ideas revolve around adding a social accountability component to decisions and increasing the ‘watchdog’ function of different political institutions to safeguard certain political standards and rights (cf. Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Kotthaus, 2015). The various proposals aim at ensuring better attributions of responsibilities, and thus to prevent misperceptions and wrong (electoral) punishments. They also aim at the creation of legal and administrative capacities to prevent the breach and misuse of common guidelines and laws. Such a rights-based approach empowers the rights holder. It seeks to strengthen institutions on the EU level and the member state level to uphold the rule of law. The contributions that approach the topic from a European foreign policy perspective suggest both a revision and a further strengthening of existing external democracy protection and promotion measures (Grimm, 2015; Kotthaus, 2015). These measures suggest a more coordinated and European solution to promote and secure democratic developments beyond European borders. They aim at building up further regional capacity and thus strengthening the EU while paying particular attention to domestic conditions. Bruszt and others demand a stronger role for the EU, focusing in particular on the economic development in the postSoviet states. The EU should concentrate on improving its economic instruments for a better management of economic interdependences. And yet, authors warn against any uniform approach to boost economic development in Eastern and Central Europe. Of course, the measures suggested in this special issue are far from exhaustive and exclusive. Moreover, they are no guarantee against democratic backsliding or a ‘hollowing out’ of western democracies. By contrast, the contributions in this issue have not touched on a range of alternative strategies and measures that nonetheless might be relevant and warrant future analysis: technological innovations, for example, offer another potential means to engage citizens. This potential has been used successfully by a range of social movements, such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, or the Pirate Party in Germany, and next to civil society organizations more broadly. Social media lower the cost of communication and allow for more interactive approaches with a wider public. A more digitally empowered civil society could help re-connect citizens to political institutions, processes and enhance decision making. With the right platforms and know-how, digital technologies could bring more voices to the political arena, and across different levels. Online voting procedures are an obvious case in point. Another possibility to counter the distrust in established democratic institutions is the reform of organizations. Distrust in parties, for example, could be countered by internal party reforms that allow for more flexibility such as intra-party alliances. In other words, existing parties could arrange for caucuses, political wings, and support organizations in more systematic ways such as to counteract the possibility of technocratic and populist majorities and elites. In the European context political parties might also take the notion of subsidiarity more seriously, and take account of the shared sovereignty between local, national and European capitals. They could organize at these different governance levels and make membership at these different levels, even multiple party memberships, possible. Overall, parties should remember they are often the outcome of political and social movements, and that they rest on a lived connection to civil society. They are social creatures that require legitimacy beyond their actual or potential success at the ballot box. By being open and re-rooted at different levels, parties would add voice to civil society and thereby become more responsive to different and changing demands. The contribution by McCarty and Kuo in this issue allows for a first tentative comparison of developments in Europe and the US. Such a comparison indicates that the US democracy faces indeed similar problems, in particular in terms of an erosion of trust in democratic institutions as well as lower levels of voter participation. At a first glance, however, the origins of these developments seem to be rather different: in the US, they can be found in the increasing ideological polarization of the party system that can be traced back until the late 1970s, as we have seen. As a result, several policy challenges have not been met, economic disparities have widened and, in turn, ultimately eroded the popular trust in political institutions (McCarty and Kuo, 2015). In other words, the decline in support in the US is somehow related to the performance of democratic institutions. However, while the developments in Europe seem to be rather multi-dimensional and hard to disentangle, there is nonetheless a common theme: the correlation between the decline in popular support of democracy and economic performance. Indeed, several contributions in this issue (cf. Greskovtis, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Bruzt, 2015; Weßels, 2015; Ruser, 2015; Weßels, 2015) highlight the role of bad domestic economic performance as a factor contributing to the erosion of both public support of, and participation in, democracy. In sum, the problem of economic growth, rising inequalities, and with it issues of social and economic justice, emerge as analytical focal points for a deeper analysis for the declining performance-related support of western democracies. While there was probably never a ‘gilded age’ of democracy, there are without doubt better and worse times for democracy, just as there are some developments that give rise to hope or concern. Currently, the erosion of trust in democratic institutions is a transatlantic phenomenon. While this special issue was not intended as a comprehensive study of the current patterns of democratic development and its origin, it did point to some of its sources and implications within and beyond Europe. The analyses provided revealed great inter- and intra-regional variations on the state of democracy, and on the reasons behind such developments. Yet, overall, it seems that democracy as a normative order seems to be not in acute danger however defined. And, yet, public content with the performance of democracy is declining on both sides of the Atlantic. This is alarming in its long-term consequences. The contributions have also highlighted that a well-performing democracy requires ‘work’, a certain stewardship: it requires periodic, if not constant, renewal and a persistence in asking questions that ‘no one dares to ask’, as Ralf Dahrendorf so aptly put it when pointing to the role of the intellectuals, and, in the context of democracy, national and transnational elites. As such, democracy requires the critical engagement of practitioners and experts alike. In this sense, this special issue has hopefully contributed to encourage debate on how to fill the void Mair (2013) so clearly identified. Helmut K. Anheier is President and Dean, and Professor of Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance. He also holds a chair of Sociology at Heidelberg University. He is currently researching the role of foundations in civil society. Helmut Anheier is author of over 300 publications, and he won various international prizes for his scholarship. His most recent publication is the second edition of his textbook Nonprofit Organizations – Theory, Management, Policy (London: Routledge, 2005 and 2014).