Conclusion: How to Rule the Void? Policy Responses to a ‘Hollowing Out’ of Democracy

Adolescence is a crucial formative period for developing persistent (dis)trust in political institutions, with long-term implications for democracy. This cross-national mixed-methods study investigates whether adolescents exhibit higher governmental trust than adults and which (un)trustworthiness criteria shaped their views during COVID-19. Quantitative data from multiple European countries (N = 3,714) show that younger adolescents reported significantly higher governmental trust than older adolescents and adults in all examined countries, with the largest difference observed in Serbia. A complementary qualitative meta-synthesis of seven primary studies (N = 251) uncovered 12 broad (un)trustworthiness criteria in COVID-19 decision-making, mostly centred on decision-making procedures. Key concerns included unpredictability, unexplained measures, and a lack of reciprocity and mutual responsibility between citizens and authorities. Younger adolescents sought closeness, emotional support, and predictability, while older adolescents and adults prioritised mutual responsibility, shared values, and clear explanations. These perspectives suggest that younger adolescents' institutional trust may diminish depending on the degree of (un)trustworthy decision-making, especially as their cognitive abilities, autonomy, societal roles, and political awareness evolve. Demonstrating or involving adolescents in trustworthy decision-making is crucial for establishing lasting institutional (dis)trust. The findings of this chapter can inform future crisis management strategies and bolster trust in democratic institutions among emerging generations.

In the young state of Indonesia, old local authorities like sultanates have reasserted themselves. This reemergence of localized authority does not necessarily conflict with nation building. Survey research among adult samples (N = 399) in the neighbouring sultanates of Yogyakarta and Surakarta found that social representations of history were implicated in the relationship between monarchism and national identity. In Yogyakarta (but not Surakarta), a positive intersection between local and national representations of history was found: events and people associated with the sultanate were also regarded as instrumental to the birth of the nation. In Yogyakarta, support for the sultanate was higher than in Surakarta: respondents argued that Yogyakarta had the culture and history required to justify status as a special autonomous region. In Yogyakarta but not Surakarta, monarchism was positively related to national identity and trust in national democratic political institutions. The intersection between local and national representations of history, especially concerning the instrumentality of the local monarchy in giving birth to the nation in Yogyakarta, created historical continuity/positive intersectionality where the superordinate nation and the local monarchy are networked in a system of power and meaning that lends trust in democratic institutions from monarchism, and strengthens national identity.

The contemporary rise of populist leadership has been widely associated with increasing political polarization and declining trust in democratic institutions. However, existing scholarship has largely treated trust erosion as a secondary consequence of affective polarization or ideological radicalization. This article advances a different argument: populist rhetoric erodes democratic trust primarily by redefining democratic procedures and institutions as illegitimate obstacles to popular sovereignty rather than as its normative foundations. The article introduces the concept of procedural cynicism to capture this shift in citizens? understanding of democracy, whereby courts, media, elections, and checks and balances are no longer perceived as safeguards of democratic rule, but as instruments of elite domination. Drawing on a mixed-methods research design, the study combines qualitative content analysis of populist leaders? speeches, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative survey analysis. The qualitative component examines recurring rhetorical strategies in the discourse of prominent populist leaders, focusing on moral dichotomization, anti-elitist framing, and the systematic delegitimization of institutional mediation. This is complemented by semi-structured interviews conducted with participants in Albania and comparative contexts, which provide insight into how populist narratives are interpreted at the individual level and how they reshape citizens? normative expectations of democratic governance. Finally, survey data from a large-scale U.S. sample are used to assess the relationship between exposure to populist rhetoric and levels of trust in democratic institutions, controlling for key socio-demographic variables. The findings demonstrate that populist rhetoric does more than intensify political antagonism. It actively transforms the meaning of democracy itself by promoting a vision of unmediated popular will that renders procedural constraints suspect or illegitimate. Interview evidence reveals that individuals influenced by populist discourse often express distrust toward democratic institutions while simultaneously affirming their commitment to ?true democracy,? indicating a normative redefinition rather than outright democratic rejection. The quantitative results support these patterns, showing a statistically significant association between exposure to populist rhetoric and reduced institutional trust, particularly among less educated and socioeconomically vulnerable groups. By conceptualizing trust erosion as a process of procedural cynicism, this article contributes to debates on populism, democratic legitimacy, and political communication. It highlights how populist rhetoric undermines democracy not only by polarizing societies, but by hollowing out the procedural foundations upon which democratic trust ultimately depends.

Studies have shown religious organizations to be among the most trusted institutions of civil society in Europe. Similarly, research has revealed that, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, church organizations boast far higher levels of trust than government organizations or nonreligious civil society institutions. In this study, the link between religion and trust in democratic institutions among individuals is explored in relation to the size of the largest religious group in twenty-one European countries. Based on the European Social Survey (Round 2, 2004) and using multilevel modeling it is concluded that the larger the size of the largest religious group, the lower the level of trust in democratic institutions among religious minorities. This finding supports the hypothesis that the larger the size of the largest religious group, the more likely minorities are to fear that the government is dominated by the largest religious group and their interests are not represented.

This chapter examines trust in democratic institutions. The chapter argues that representative democracy is founded on a relationship between citizens and state premised on trust. Trust is important for two reasons: (1) sovereignty is transferred from the people to a legislative body, meaning that the stability and vitality depend, in part, upon trust; and (2) trust serves as a creator of collective power, enabling leaders to make commitments on the basis of it and govern more effectively. Multivariate models confirm that trust in democratic institutions is multidimensional. The research pinpoints its values-based components, its rootedness in civil society, its performance-based aspects and its grounding in political partisanship. In addition, the research not only shows that trust differ between the east and the west, but that it is conditioned by different theoretical mechanisms. The findings have implications for democratic reform and for research about cultivating trust in new democracies.

The role of health and health systems in shaping political engagement and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions

Background: Political participation and trust in democratic institutions are critical indicators of the strength and sustainability of democratic systems. Among youth, particularly university students, these factors shape future civic engagement and governance outcomes. Objective: To examine the patterns of political participation and levels of trust in democratic institutions among university students, and to explore how institutional trust influences youth engagement in political processes. Methods: A mixed-methods approach was employed, surveying 400 university students and conducting in-depth interviews with 20 participants. Quantitative data captured trends in political participation, while qualitative interviews provided insights into perceptions, motivations, and barriers to engagement. Results: The result showed that political involvement was moderate, and the most common form of participation was voting and digital activism, but official party membership was low. Democratic institutions were largely distrusted with poor scores in political parties and parliament but the judiciary scored relatively higher. Institutional trust and political participation have a positive and weak relationship. A set of qualitative themes consisted of ideas of corruption, inefficiency, and representation absence as obstacles and positive expectations about youth-led politics and the empowering influence of digital platforms. Conclusion: The paper highlights the role of institutional trust in juvenile political participation and the Digital Divide as a significant limitation, especially among the more rural students. Increasing transparency, accountability, and digital inclusivity is the key to improving youth participation and resilience among democratic institutions.

Research on the Roleof Santri Middle Class in Democratization Process in Indonesia was conducted in three cities in Java, i.e. the Cities of East Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. The research was conducted by using quantitative approach and survey method. The data collection method used in this research is direct interview technique, by using questionnaire instrument that was asked to the respondents directly through face to face.There are two types of hypotheses to be proved through this survey research, they are associative and comparativehypotheses.The associative hypothesis verification aims to prove whether there is significant relationship between dependent variable (Y) and independent variable (X) as predictor or not. Inthis research context, the relationship between role in the democratization process as the dependent variable (Y) with predictor independent variables(X) will be tested, which are the literacy of political and economic information(X1), satisfaction to public services (X2), trust in democratic institutions (X3), access to political resources (X4), ideology (X5), and relative deprivation (X6).The comparative hypothesisverificationaims to prove whether there is significant difference between two or more different respondent groups or not. Based on this research purpose, the differences of two respondent groups will be proved comparatively related to their role in the democratization process; they are (1) santrimiddle-class group and (2) groups of santrinon-middle class.There are two types of hypotheses to be proved through this survey research, they are associative and comparative hypotheses. The associative hypothesis verification aims to prove whether there is significant relationship between dependent variable (Y) and independent variable (X) as predictor or not. In this research context, the relationship between role in the democratization process as the dependent variable (Y) with predictor independent variables (X) will be tested, which are the literacy of political and economic information (X1), satisfaction to public services (X2), trust in democratic institutions (X3), access to political resources (X4), ideology (X5), and relative deprivation (X6). The comparative hypothesis verification aims to prove whether there is significant difference between two or more different respondent groups or not. Based on this research purpose, the differences of two respondent groups will be proved comparatively related to their role in the democratization process; they are (1) santri middle-class group and (2) groups of santri non-middle class.From the result of hypothesis associative verification, it is proved that all variables X correlated positively and significantly to variable Y. With this result, then the literacy of political and economic information (X1), satisfaction to public services (X2), trust in democratic institutions (X3), access to political resources (X4), ideology (X5), and relative deprivation (X6) are proved to correlate positively and significantly to the role in democratization (Y).From the result of comparative hypothesis verification, the X2 value of 1363.44 is obtained. This value is greater than the X2 value of table at 88 degrees of freedom and significance level of 0.5. With this result, then the null hypothesis which stated that there is no significant difference between santri middle class and other class groups is rejected. This means the alternative hypothesis that stated otherwise is received. Conclusion based on this examination result is that there are significant differences between the role of santri middle class and other group samples in the democratization process.

ABSTRACTDeliberative democracy assumes that management decisions based on open voluntary and fair procedures are rational and just. This article presents arguments that deliberative democracy can bolster trust in democratic institutions. Moreover, deliberative practices can increase citizens’ level of political trust not only in stable democracies but also in hybrid regimes. This is demonstrated through an examination of participatory budgeting in Ukraine, with the use of data from a field experiment in 2015–2016 (with 740 participants).

Introduction. The spread of fake news on the internet is an increasingly serious problem. When analysing belief in fake news, people are usually treated as homogeneous group, however, previous studies suggest that different groups may exist. This study aims to identify clusters of older people according to their level of belief in real and fake news. Methods. 504 people aged 50 to 90 years (M=64.37, SD=9.10) participated in the study. Belief in true and false news was assessed using 10 news headlines (six false, four true). Respondents’ vaccination intentions and trust in democratic institutions were assessed. A cluster analysis was performed to distinguish between groups of respondents. Results. Four clusters were identified and replicated: moderately believing in fake and real news; believing in real but not in fake news; tending not to believe in either real or fake news; and tending to believe in both real and fake news. Individuals who fell into the cluster of believers in both real and fake news had lower intentions to vaccinate against COVID-19 and lower trust in political institutions. Conclusions. The study provides evidence that people aren’t homogeneous in their belief in fake and real news, and four meaningful clusters can be distinguished.

ABSTRACTDemocratic consolidation relies on a degree of political trust and support for new democratic institutions and actors. A decline in political trust threatens the legitimacy of institutions, and democracy itself. Using Ipsos Khayabus 2014 national public opinion survey data, the paper explores levels of political trust in South Africa's transitional society in late 2014. It asks whether there is a sufficient mass of ‘critical citizens’ to ensure accountable government, and trust expressed towards key objects in the political system. We find that a majority of South Africans are critical citizens, offering conditional support based on performance evaluations. However, we also find little distinction in the minds of citizens between political institutions and the actors that inhabit them. Low levels of trust in political actors tend to erode trust in institutions. In turn, political trust in democratic institutions is also linked to evaluations of the ruling party; signalling the dangers of a prolonged stay in power by a dominant party. Finally, we conclude with possible implications for democratic consolidation by arguing that if despondence with current actors and institutions increases citizens may become less satisfied with democracy and less inclined to embrace the dream of a democratic, unified nation.

Deep-seated challenges concerning service delivery, mis-governance, corruption and state capture were uncovered by the Zondo Commission of inquiry. While the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment continued to persist as well, at the same time, disillusionment with democracy has led to citizens questioning its status as the preferred government form. In this study, the connection between corruption perceptions and the evaluation of democracy in South Africa’s third decade is explored. A quantitative methodology utilising descriptive statistics and an analysis drawing from public opinion data accessed through the South African Social Attitudes Survey is adopted for this study. Key findings that emanate from the study indicate that the South African public is now more likely to recognise corruption as one of the top three problems that face South Africa. The results also indicate a growing preference for non-democratic, authoritarian governments. This has been characterised by low voter turnout in the local government elections of 2016 and 2021, and the national and provincial elections of 2019 and 2024. Erosion of public trust in democratic institutions—the government, courts and parliament—has fuelled the delegitimisation of democracy, with citizens showing growing wariness. Democracy has suffered from a decade of perceived unchecked corruption, a trend set to continue unless the state intervenes with anti-corruption measures, accountability initiatives and successful prosecutions of those accused of state capture and grand corruption.

The article provides a systematic analysis of threats to compliance with legal principles of elections in a globalized digital society. It is argued that elections are one of the main elements of democracy, through which individuals and political parties gain power, the international legal system has formed established legal principles of the electoral process that determine its acceptability, legality and legitimization of results. The globalized digital society creates additional opportunities for the exercise of electoral rights, along with threats to the established legal principles of elections. Free and fair elections are the basis of the democratic process. Electoral abuses undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process, the general acceptability of election results and challenge the democratization process. These principles call for expanding access to voting and democracy and removing barriers to participation, which can be achieved by harnessing the potential benefits of a globalized digital society. The author argues that disinformation poses a threat to democracy and elections, with far-reaching consequences for human rights and democratic norms around the world, threatening freedom of expression, the right to privacy and the right to democratic participation, as well as jeopardizing a range of economic, social and cultural rights, reducing broader indicators of the quality of democracy, undermining citizens’ trust in democratic institutions. Disinformation during elections undermines trust in democratic institutions by fueling false negative beliefs about the integrity of elections, or by supporting dictators by creating false positive perceptions of them. It argues that a comprehensive strategy is needed to protect electoral rights and electoral procedures from the impact of the digital society with its manifestations of cyberattacks and disinformation. The positions of the scientific community on the appropriateness of using electronic voting tools are considered. The thesis is proved that, in general, while identifying significant positives for the state and members of society when introducing new technologies, from the point of view of political and legal practice, one should be cautious about the active introduction of electronic elections into the implementation sphere. Keywords: elections, electoral rights, globalized digital society, disinformation, legal regulation, legal principles, legitimacy of government, electronic elections.

The article attempts to examine the progress that has been made in the area of self-government over the last quarter century in Poland. Not only has the chaos in the institutional process in this period affected the overall low level of citizens' trust in democratic institutions, but it also led to absence of effective cooperation between them. The author indicates two methods of both increasing public trust in the institution and increasing effectiveness of cooperation between institutions themselves, i.e. systematic changes in the self-government and glocalization of public trust.

In times of severe international crises, such as wars and terrorist attacks, citizens tend to ‘rally around the flag’ and increase their support for political leaders. We ask if the rallying effects identified in the literature extend to the societal lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19-related lockdowns differ from crises studied in the existing literature because they are political crisis responses with severe and immediate negative effects on the economy. Using daily responses right before and after the announcement of the Danish lockdown on March 11, 2020, we study trust in democratic institutions among unemployed Danes over the first three weeks of a large-scale societal lockdown. OLS estimates show that trust in the Danish Prime Minister’s administration was higher immediately after the lockdown announcement. This increase lasted throughout the entire period of measurement (until the end of March). We find similarly increased trust in other institutions, most significantly the judicial system and the public sector at large, whereas findings for trust in parliament and the media are less clear. Interrupted time series estimates point to the same conclusions albeit they produce estimates with more noise. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that citizens tend to ‘rally around the flag’ in times of crisis and furthermore suggest that increased trust tends to spill over to institutions that are not involved in crisis management decisions.