Conclusion: Contours, Causes, and Consequences of Civilian Control

Abstract

The focus of this book is on the contours, causes, and consequences of civilian control of the military in democratizing Asia. Based on our reading of democratic theory, we have identified civil—military relations as a crucial component for the consolidation and deepening of nascent democracies: only if the military is under the firm control of civilians who are subject to the democratic process can democratic institutions function properly. Even though proofing a political regime against military coup d’etats is certainly an important aspect of establishing civilian control, it is not simply a set of measures and techniques intended to prevent a military coup. Instead, civilian control is a much broader concept that we have defined as being the situation in which civilians possess effective political decision-making power in all relevant political matters. Following from this definition, we differentiated five decision-making areas in civil—military relations: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. To explain why the establishment of civilian control succeeds or fails in new democracies, we developed an explanatory model in which civilians make strategic use of structural, institutional, and ideational resources in order to reduce the military’s ‘opportunity and disposition’ (Finer, 1962) to resist or prevent the institutionalization and enforcement of civilian authority over each of the five decision-making areas.