Concerning Gibson's ‘on the face of it’: Immediate perception and single-glance face recognition

Abstract

The paper notes (1) that “thinking Gibsonian” is to be torn between two loves: cognition and reality, (2) that just because of this the cognitive scientist may beneficiently and more thoroughly rediscover that they are only two faces of his one true love: Meaning. This issue is elaborated as “the problem of intentionality” and culminates in the conclusion that Gibson's direct ecological approach to visual perception is not a theory about the constitution of perceptual meaning, which is the domain of the indirect cognitive approach. Therefore the constant Gibsonian attacks on indirect theories might be both misled and misleading. The second half of the paper begins with noting that this may be due to a confounding of the “direct” level of explanation of the perceiver with the “indirect” levels of phenomenologist and visual scientist. Next the scientist's process notions of direct and indirect theories are discussed with respect to single-glance face recognition. Within this second half of the paper about 20 different meanings of “direct” or “immediate” are presented (printed in italics). Most of these are generally acceptable and should, thus, not be invoked in support of entirely different notions, which are very problematic because these seem to eliminate the concept of mind-as-cognitive-process.